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Abstract 
The transport network in France was responsible for providing everything the British 
Expeditionary Force [BEF] required in order to both survive and conduct operations on the 
Western Front. The appointment of Sir Eric Geddes to the position of Director-General of 
Transportation in the autumn of 1916 is now widely accepted as having provided the BEF with 
the logistical platform from which to build the war-winning machine of 1918. Yet prior to 
Geddes’ arrival in France, the BEF had already begun engaging with Britain’s transport 
experts. This article examines the work of the South-Eastern and Chatham Railway [SECR] at 
the port of Boulogne during 1915. It illustrates that the BEF, far from being insular, was highly 
active in harnessing civilian support. However, due to the as yet incomplete understanding of 
the character of the war, the long-term contribution of the SECR was severely restricted by 
the short-term inability of the company, and the BEF, to adequately comprehend the colossal 
material effort required for victory on the Western Front. 
Keywords 
Logistics, civil-military relations, industrial warfare, administration, efficiency 
Introduction 
John Terraine once lamented that 1918 was the ‘forgotten’ year of the First World War. 
Ignored by partisan, influential writers on the conflict such as Lloyd George and Basil Liddell 
Hart, the final year of the conflict – the year of victory – was submerged by a narrative which 
placed undue stress upon the vast, indecisive struggles of 1916 and 1917. From this ferment 
brewed the ‘myths’ that Terraine, and a generation of ‘revisionist’ historians in his wake, have 
battled to debunk. The outcome has been the production in the past two decades of a wealth 
of literature on the military campaigns of 1918, in which the scale, complexity and proficiency 
of the British Expeditionary Force’s [BEF] ‘war machine’ has been cited as evidence to dismiss 
criticisms of the British high command’s hide-bound, technical backwardness. Consequently, 
the faltering genesis of that ‘machine’ in the period 1914-1915 tends to have been 
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overshadowed.1 During 1915, the BEF more than trebled in size. Over 650,000 men were 
added to the ration strength between January and October alone.2 The historiography of the 
year, dominated by the dismal failure at Gallipoli, the training of Kitchener’s recruits and the 
‘shells scandal’, has overlooked the administrative achievement of ensuring this increase took 
place without the troops experiencing starvation. Using the extant records of the directorates 
most intimately connected with the task of managing the logistical implications of the BEF’s 
expansion, this article seeks to correct this imbalance and demonstrate that the BEF – even 
prior to the renowned civilian mission led by Sir Eric Geddes during the Battle of the Somme 
– actively sought out and engaged with experts from Britain to help solve recognisably 
‘civilian’ problems of transport and supply.3 
 
Unlike Geddes’ wide-ranging mission, the experiment at Boulogne spearheaded by Francis 
Dent was small-scale and localised in scope. It was subject to restrictions set both by a British 
Army still attempting to comprehend the magnitude of the war in which it had become 
embroiled, and those of a French Army and state unwilling to relinquish command and 
influence over the foreign forces engaged on their soil. The result of these twin constraints 
was to limit this ‘early experiment’ to what Brown described as an ‘ad hoc’ attempt to solve 
the key constraint governing operational success on the Western Front; the sufficient and 
reliable supply of myriad goods to the fighting troops. 4  Such attempts were largely 
uncoordinated and vacillating, hindered by problems inherent in the expansion of the British 
commitment to the war and the consequent decentralisation of command on British lines of 
communication which ultimately remained under the control of the dominant power in the 
coalition, the French.5 
                                                          
1 I.M. Brown, ‘Growing Pains: Supplying the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1915’ in Battles Near and Far: A 
Century of Operational Deployment, ed. by P. Dennis and J. Grey (Canberra: Army History Unit: Department of 
Defence, 2004), pp. 33-47. 
2 I.M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914-1919 (London: Praeger, 1998), p. 103. 
3 K. Grieves, ‘The Transportation Mission to GHQ, 1916’, in ‘Look to Your Front!’ Studies in the First World War 
by the British Commission for Military History, ed. by B. Bond et al (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1999), pp. 63-78. 
4 M. Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), p. 1; Brown, British Logistics, p. 139. 
5 Decentralisation of administrative tasks was viewed as necessary ‘in view of the large increases in the forces in 
the field’. See The National Archives [TNA]: Public Record Office [PRO] WO 95/27 Quarter-Master General, 
French to Kitchener, 18 January 1915; TNA: PRO WO 95/74 Director of Supplies, diary entry, 20 December 1914. 
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The challenges of expansion 
The preparations of the War Office prior to August 1914 made no plans for the extraordinary 
increase in size of the BEF which took place after the initial engagements had proven 
indecisive. 6  The pre-war ‘conversations’ between French and British staffs led to an 
agreement by which the logistics of the BEF were to be ‘manned and controlled by the 
French’, who would undertake ‘the work of construction, repair, maintenance, traffic 
management and protection’ required to supply the British both in France and beyond the 
Belgian frontier once the anticipated advance began.7 As a result, aside from liaison officers 
to coordinate movements at the ports of disembarkation, the BEF set sail without a labour 
force to assist in the task of unloading supplies at the Channel ports. The expansion of the BEF 
meant that transporting large numbers of troops to and from the battlefields would require 
an increasing amount of port space to be dedicated to the disembarkation of soldiers, with 
the corresponding necessity for further room to be set aside to deal with the numerous 
shipments of foodstuffs, munitions, vehicles and other supplies required to preserve the 
fighting efficiency of the force.8 The creation of opposing trench lines over the winter months 
also gave rise to demands for ‘many kinds of tools and stores required in siege warfare’; large 
quantities of sandbags, barbed wire and entrenching tools being demanded to help secure 
the front line.9 
 
Furthermore, the BEF were not the only body reliant upon the Channel ports. Both the Belgian 
and French armies also drew supplies from the ports, demands exacerbated by the loss of 
much of France’s industrial heartland to the Germans, losses which left the French 
increasingly dependent upon imports of coal from Britain.10 Enormous quantities of coal were 
required for the heating of homes, for powering the factories that were to produce all kinds 
                                                          
6 Brown, British Logistics, pp. 75-6. 
7  A.M. Henniker, History of the Great War. Transportation on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (London: His 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1937), p. 13. This was emphasized in the instructions issued to supply officers on 
mobilization. See TNA: PRO WO 33/686 Instructions for the Inspector-General of Communications, Part II, p. 1. 
8 Henniker, Transportation, p. 90. 
9 TNA: PRO WO 95/3950 Inspector General, Robertson to Maxwell, 29 November 1914. 
10 On the eve of war, the area directly affected by the German invasion accounted approximately three-quarters 
of French coal and coke production. See J. Lawrence, ‘The transition to war, 1914’, in Capital Cities at War: Paris, 
London, Berlin, 1914-1919, ed. by J. Winter and J. Robert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 
135-63 (p. 152). 
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of war matériel and for the operation of the railways upon which the majority of supplies for 
the coalition were sent forward.11 Such a resource was clearly vital to the wellbeing of the 
forces and fundamental to the French war effort, however it was not merely coal which 
‘monopolised’ the limited capacity of the docks. Significant quantities of wine were also being 
stored in dockside warehouses, ‘to the detriment of efficient working of disembarkation of 
troops and stores’.12 
 
It was not only supplies and troops entering France that drew upon the resources of the ports. 
The extent of the German advance meant that Calais - earmarked by the Royal Navy for the 
evacuation of sick and wounded soldiers - was also receiving a considerable influx of Belgian 
refugees looking to obtain passage to Britain. Although land existed for the expansion of 
sidings and storage accommodation, alongside the construction of additional harbour space 
at the Channel ports, such projects were time consuming, expensive and required significant 
quantities of skilled labour. As the French Army had suffered nearly a million casualties by the 
end of 1914, the coalition’s senior partner was unable to provide the manpower required for 
such large-scale engineering works. In addition, previously reserved occupations such as the 
stevedores provided for the use of the BEF were increasingly required to replace the fallen in 
the French ranks.13 
 
With so many compelling demands placed upon them, it was imperative that the available 
space on the Channel coast was worked with the utmost efficiency. However, an investigation 
into the BEF’s rail transport arrangements in October 1914 – commissioned by Lord Kitchener 
and undertaken by the Canadian railway expert Sir Percy Girouard – examined Boulogne’s 
suitability as an army base and concluded it ‘to be in a somewhat disorganised condition’.14 
                                                          
11 TNA: PRO WO 95/3951 Inspector General, Cowper to Marrable, 27 November 1914. 
12 WO 95/3951, Moore to Marrable, 25 November 1914. However, as pointed out to the plaintiff wine, far from 
being the ‘matter of pure luxury’ it was considered in Britain, was in fact ‘the staple beverage of all classes’ in 
France, formed part of the military ration and was, therefore, argued to be an integral element of the French 
war effort. See Cowper to Marrable, 27 November 1914. 
13 WO 95/3951 Shortland to Maxwell, 9 December 1914; Maxwell to Kitchener, 12 December 1914; Robertson 
to Huguet, 11 January 1915. 
14 TNA: PRO WO 32/5144 Report on rail transport arrangements for British Army on the continent by General Sir 
E. Girouard, p. 13; Girouard to Cowans, 24 October 1914. 
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Girouard concluded that, in light of the inability of the French to supply the required labour, 
it would be necessary for Britain to provide the ‘sheds, sidings and many other works’ deemed 
‘requisite to get anything like the full capacity out of such places as Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, 
Ostend or even Zeebrugge’.15 By December, the situation at all the ports in use by the BEF 
was deteriorating, a problem deepened by a deficiency of cranes suited to the tasks of 
unloading military supplies and a lack of covered accommodation under which to shelter 
items such as hay and oats from the winter weather. 16  On the basis of Girouard’s 
observations, officers in the BEF prepared a project for the extension of sidings and storage 
accommodation around the Bassin Loubet, one of the two docking basins at the port of 
Boulogne, a job described by the Inspector-General of Communications [IGC] as ‘vital’ and 
‘urgent’ were the BEF to develop Boulogne as a supply base.17 
 
The accomplishment of this task, in addition to all the other duties being thrown upon them 
in the opening months of the war, was beyond the limited number of Royal Engineers in 
France.18 As a result, arrangement of the civil engineering work required at the port was 
passed on to the Railway Executive Committee [REC] to delegate to a capable individual. The 
Chief Engineer of the South-Eastern and Chatham Railway [SECR], Percy Tempest, took on the 
responsibility.19 Between December 1914 and September 1916, the SECR would provide the 
tools, material, labour and supervision for the provision of sidings; loading platforms; roads 
and railways; storehouses; workshops; the laying of over two miles of drain pipes and even 
the construction of a 700 foot long sea wall. 20  The contribution of the company to the 
operations at Boulogne would not, however, be restricted to engineering. Tempest was joined 
at the Bassin Loubet by the General Manager of the SECR, Mr (later Sir) Francis Dent who, 
along with forwarding Tempest’s estimates for the costs and duration of the intended works, 
                                                          
15 WO 32/5144, Report on rail transport arrangements, pp. 10-3. The inclusion of Ostend and Zeebrugge in 
Girouard’s deliberations demonstrates the mindset of the period, that trench warfare was merely a temporary 
expedient. 
16 TNA: PRO WO 95/74 Director of Supplies, diary entry, 9 December 1914; 13 December 1914. 
17 WO 95/3951 Maxwell to Robertson, 30 November 1914; TNA: PRO WO 158/2 Director of Supplies: British 
Armies in France and Flanders Pt I, p. 146. 
18 WO 95/3951 Robertson to Kitchener, 28 November 1914. 
19 E.A. Pratt, British Railways and the Great War; Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and Achievements, 2 vols. 
(London: Selwyn & Blount, 1921), II, pp. 634-5. 
20 The construction work at the port would continue, under the supervision of the SECR, until September 1916. 
See ‘Special War Services by the South-Eastern and Chatham Railway’, Railway Magazine, May 1920, p. 347. 
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also added his view that the capacity of the port was suffering due to inefficient goods 
handling practices both from ship to quayside and from dock to railway.21 For the next year, 
the SECR would actively assist the military authorities in France as the BEF sought to improve 
the throughput of goods from ship to rail at Boulogne. 
Francis Dent and the Bassin Loubet 
Dent’s pre-war career gave him prior experience in solving the problems identified at 
Boulogne. A lifelong railwayman, Dent had entered the General Manager’s office of the 
London and North-Western Railway [LNWR] at seventeen, and over the following two 
decades had served the company in a variety of roles and locations. Dent’s abilities and 
‘efficient work in each of these positions’ led to a series of promotions, and was typified by 
Dent’s approach to congestion at Broad Street Station, one of the busiest stations in turn-of-
the-century London.22 With traffic numbers and the volume of merchandise to be handled 
through the station rising, it had been feared that the station would require significant 
expansion. However, through various arrangements, including a generous bonus payment 
scheme for the station’s workforce, Dent accelerated the turn round of goods and rendered 
the station enlargement unnecessary.23 The challenges of improving efficiencies within the 
limited storage space available at Boulogne were, therefore, intelligible and recognisable to 
a man like Dent, whose career continued to blossom after the Broad Street reorganisation. 
 
Dent’s commitment to economic working practices, 24  and skills as a freight transport 
organiser led to his appointment as Chief Goods Manager on the SECR in 1907. Four years 
later he became General Manager. This promotion not only brought Dent a wage packet 
which reflected his social status as a leading railway manager in Edwardian Britain, but also 
brought him into close professional contact with the pre-war British Army, being appointed 
                                                          
21 WO 95/74 diary entry, 11 December 1914. It is not clear from the existing records whether Dent’s initial 
observations were actively requested by the Supplies Directorate, or if Dent’s visit to Boulogne coincided with 
one of his numerous trips to France in the early months of the war in conjunction with his role as chair of the 
Ambulance Trains for the Continent subcommittee of the REC. 
22 ‘The New General Manager of the South-Eastern and Chatham Railway’, Railway Magazine, April 1911, p. 304. 
23 ‘Retirement of Sir Francis Dent. General Manager, South-Eastern and Chatham Railway’, Railway Magazine, 
April 1920, pp. 252-3. 
24 ‘New General Manager’, p. 304. 
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to the REC in May 1913. The REC, which comprised the General Managers of the railway 
companies most intimately involved in the mobilisation process for the BEF, was a permanent 
consultative body and a forum for discussion and knowledge-sharing between railway 
companies, established in the wake of the Agadir Crisis to help accelerate Britain’s military 
response in the event of war. It would administer the railways of Britain under instruction 
from the government throughout the conflict. Dent’s contribution on behalf of the SECR 
would largely consist of ensuring that: the locomotives, train crews and rolling stock would 
be available; and that the troops would be collected from their peace stations and 
transported to their ports of embarkation on the assigned date and time listed on their 
mobilisation timetable. The location of the SECR, serving Woolwich and the south-east, also 
led to the company being appointed as ‘secretary railway’ to the army’s Eastern Command, a 
role involving significant levels of civil-military interaction in order to ensure all details of the 
mobilisation scheme were kept up-to-date.25 
 
Thus in 1914 Francis Dent was a highly-experienced professional railway manager, a man with 
a recognised talent for promoting efficiency and conversant with the intricacies of military 
demands. At forty-seven years of age he was too old to enlist in the ranks, however by the 
time he arrived at Boulogne Dent had already made a number of contributions to the war 
effort. Following the completion of the mobilisation programme, Dent had acted as chairman 
of a subcommittee of the REC charged with the duty of providing ambulance trains for the 
higher-than-expected numbers of wounded soldiers arriving back in Britain. Dent, working 
alongside two Surgeon-Generals from the Royal Army Medical Corps and a representative of 
the War Office, was tasked in September 1914 with standardising a design for new ambulance 
trains and supervising their production. Within weeks of his appointment, Dent was charged 
with overseeing the production of ambulance trains for use in France as well as Britain. By 
December, plans were already underway for British firms to build bespoke ambulance trains 
                                                          
25 The complexity of these arrangements is illustrated in the surviving timetables, which detail the precise nature 
of the schedule required to be kept by the railway companies. For an example, see TNA: PRO WO 33/684 Eastern 
Command mobilization railway programme, Part I and II, 1914. 
 
 
8 
 
consisting of staff-cars, kitchen-cars, pharmacy-cars and stores cans alongside carriages 
designed to take stretchers and ‘sitting up’ cases.26 
 
Dent’s next contribution, at Boulogne, would be of a different order altogether, 
demonstrating the uncoordinated nature of Britain’s response to the multitude of short-term 
challenges thrown up by her increasing involvement in the war. Although primarily a 
passenger rail line in peace time, the SECR also controlled the two principal ferry services 
running from Dover-Calais and Folkestone-Boulogne, providing the company with both a 
working knowledge of the Channel ports and offices at both. Indeed, even before Tempest 
and Dent arrived, staff of the SECR had been made available for the BEF’s use at Boulogne.27 
This, coupled with his prior experiences, led Dent to offering to spend a fortnight at the port, 
studying ‘the situation on the spot’ before putting forward detailed suggestions as to how 
efficiency could be improved at Boulogne.28 The period of investigation led Dent to observe 
that: ‘Boulogne is a very good port for quick handling and, by using it properly, the transit of 
supplies to the front is much accelerated’. 29  To ensure that ‘proper’ use was made of 
Boulogne, Dent suggested that the SECR should take responsibility not only for the building 
work at the Bassin Loubet, but for the operation of all areas of the port reserved for the BEF. 
Dent’s proposal entailed the SECR taking over the ‘work of discharging ships, stacking supplies 
and loading trains, [and] providing all the personnel’ for these tasks rather than relying upon 
an increasingly unreliable supply of labour from the French.30 
 
Essentially, Dent was offering to supersede a suggestion made by the Director of Railway 
Transport the previous month, that an experienced officer of the SECR could act as a Deputy 
Assistant Director of Railway Transport with an experienced military officer acting as an 
‘adjoint’ to the civilian specialists.31 The SECR would replace the existing system whereby the 
                                                          
26 Pratt, British Railways and the Great War, I, pp. 195-227. 
27 TNA: PRO WO 95/64 Director of Railway Transport, Twiss to Murray, 21 November 1914. 
28 WO 95/74 diary entry, 11 December 1914. 
29 TNA: PRO WO 95/3952 Inspector General, Dent to Cowans, 31 December 1914. 
30 WO 95/3952 Dent to Clayton, 28 December 1914; Clayton to Dent, 30 December 1914. 
31 WO 95/64 Twiss to Murray, 21 November 1914. 
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navy was responsible for the discharge of the ships onto the quayside, and the army for the 
forward transport and storage of goods. 32  In a memorandum issued to the Director of 
Supplies, Dent outlined the rationale behind his recommendations. The object of the Bassin 
Loubet in peace time ‘was to ensure quick transit between steamer and train. The hangars 
were laid out with a view to easy checking and customs examination’, 33  and the boats 
engaged in supplying the port were, by and large, the railway steamers used in peace time. 
The work of discharging ships, stacking supplies and loading trains was no different to the 
work undertaken at the railway ports controlled by the SECR in peacetime. In fact, the military 
work would be ‘simple’ when compared to ordinary trade practices, as the vast majority of 
supplies would be arriving in bulk and would not require lengthy customs examinations upon 
arrival in France.34 There was, Dent concluded, ‘nothing in the way of checking or loading that 
would not be easy enough for a railway checker’ to perform.35 
 
By managing the port using civilian working methods, Dent believed the dock to be capable 
of turning over 5,000 tons per day, provided that ‘certain factors that operate against quick 
work’ were eliminated. The proposed solution to these factors, including the new sidings and 
accommodation then under construction, were designed to produce a system whereby the 
majority of supplies were transferred directly from ship to rail. Those required urgently at the 
front could therefore be sent forward quickly; items not immediately required could be 
moved to storage sites away from the docks, keeping the quayside free for the discharge of 
arriving vessels.36 With the quantity of food alone to be handled daily through the Channel 
ports projected to reach 4,400 tons per day once Kitchener’s volunteers arrived,37 Dent’s 
estimates were understandably appealing to the officers charged with ensuring the BEF 
continued to receive sustenance. The Director of Supplies, Major-General Frederick Clayton, 
                                                          
32 TNA: PRO WO 95/3953 Inspector General, Proceedings of second meeting of committee on Mr Dent’s scheme 
held at Boulogne on 15 February 1915; Brown, British Logistics, p. 88. 
33 WO 95/3952 Boulogne – Memorandum by F.H. Dent, 28 December 1914. 
34 WO 95/3952 Boulogne – Memorandum. 
35 WO 95/3952 Dent to Clayton, 28 December 1914. 
36 WO 95/3952 Boulogne – Memorandum. Dent believed the full capacity of the docks to be 7,000 tons per day, 
the lower estimate being a reflection of the staff during the war which consisted of ‘boys and men not of military 
age’. 
37 WO 95/3952 diary entry, 16 January 1915. 
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was sceptical of the figures Dent estimated were achievable at Boulogne however, and had 
reservations over the practicality of the ‘quick transit’ scheme being suggested. 
 
A central part of Dent’s plan to maximise efficiency at the Bassin Loubet involved the loading 
of cargo in Britain so that ‘each ship should have approximately sufficient of everything to 
make the greater part of one or more supply trains’.38 This would ensure that trains could be 
made up directly from the quayside, reducing the amount of ‘double-handling’ required in 
unloading ships, storing within the harbour and then transferring to rail. Any surplus stock on 
each ship, or perishable items which had to be ‘turned over’, would go into systematised 
stores for later despatch. Such a system was however, unfeasible as a solution to the BEF’s 
transport problems, as exemplified by the transportation of food. 
 
The bulk of a soldier’s ration was meat and bread. The meat was taken from cold storage ships 
berthed at Boulogne, the bread baked (in December 1914 at least) in an open field. French 
transport provided the link between the bakeries and the railways.39 Neither commodity 
would therefore be on board the ships whose cargo was being transferred direct to rail. The 
other rations sent forward were varied.40 Fresh meat would be exchanged for preserved, 
whilst vegetables, bacon and butter would also be rotated to ensure that ‘Tommy’ received a 
diet that was not endless ‘tea and dog biscuits’.41 Additionally, items such as petrol and 
lubricating oil which were required at the front were not transported on the same ships as 
food to prevent contamination. In short therefore, ‘you could not pack a train for any 
formation straight from the ship except as regards hay and oats’.42 
 
                                                          
38 WO 95/3952 Boulogne – Memorandum. 
39 As a demonstration of the ‘ad hoc’ nature of the BEF’s approach in the early months of the war, the bakery at 
Boulogne was originally set up on the only space available for it, the seafront itself. See WO 158/2 Supplies, p. 
154. 
40 WO 95/3952 Clayton to Dent, 30 December 1914. 
41 A. Weeks, Tea, Rum and Fags: Sustaining Tommy, 1914-18 (Stroud: History Press, 2009), pp. 7-10. 
42 WO 95/3952 Clayton to Dent, 30 December 1914. 
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Despite these detailed criticisms Clayton was, at this point of the war at least,43 sufficiently 
amenable to civilian observations to encourage further discussion of Dent’s suggestions, as 
was the Quartermaster-General, William Robertson. Both saw potential benefits in allowing 
the SECR increased responsibility in the operation of the port, and a committee was formed 
to consider discuss amendments and improvements to Dent’s scheme. The membership of 
the committee emphasises the number of departments with vested interests in the supply 
procedures of the BEF, officers being drawn from the staffs of: the Principal Naval Transport 
Officer; Director of Railway Transport; Director of Supplies (Clayton himself was to preside); 
the Director of Works and the Director of Ordnance Services.44 
 
The complexity of the intended operations and Dent’s commitments to the REC were such 
that a comprehensive statement of the intended arrangements was not submitted in time for 
the committee’s first meeting in late January 1915. 45  Nevertheless, both the naval and 
military elements saw the ‘advantage’ of centralising responsibility for the management of 
Boulogne and were willing to accept Dent’s offer subject to approval from GHQ, the War 
Office and, naturally, the French authorities.46 In the two weeks following the committee’s 
first meeting, Fred West – the Goods Superintendent of the SECR’s London district – was 
tasked to ‘ascertain the system of work of the various departments and to discuss various 
points with the officers in charge’.47 Upon the completion of his fortnight-long investigation 
the committee reconvened to examine West’s report, a combination of observations 
regarding the existing situation at the port and recommendations to help the BEF ‘obtain the 
maximum amount of efficiency and economy’ going forward.48 
                                                          
43  Clayton’s open-minded approach to civilian investigations of the working practices on the lines of 
communication would not last. A series of ‘missions’ took place between January 1915 and the summer of 1916, 
during which time Clayton’s attitude towards civilian ‘interference’ underwent a sea change. This culminated 
with a scathing rejoinder to a report by the shipping magnate Sir Thomas Royden issued in July 1916. See 
University of Warwick Modern Records Centre, Papers of Sir William Guy Granet, MSS.191/3/3/14 Remarks on 
the Report of the Commission sent out by the Shipping Control Committee. 
44 WO 95/3952 Robertson to Maxwell, 9 January 1915. 
45 WO 95/3953 Clayton to Twiss, 3 February 1915. 
46 WO 95/3952 diary entry, 29 January 1915; WO 95/64 French to Kitchener, 23 February 1915. The committee’s 
approval was retained despite Dent’s subsequent downward revision of the estimated capacity of the Bassin 
Loubet to 3,536 tons per day. 
47 WO 95/3952 Commandant, Boulogne Base to Clayton, 27 January 1915. 
48 WO 95/3953 Bassin Loubet – Boulogne. Mr West’s Report, 13 February 1915. 
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The second meeting of the committee focused upon the importance of installing an 
appropriate ‘single authority’ to centralize control of the supply system within the port. The 
committee suggested that the navy, due to their inexperience in managing the land-based 
transport required to shift supplies away from the quayside, should cede responsibility for 
the work of discharging ships to that ‘single authority’. Once a ship had been successfully 
berthed at the port, therefore, the navy’s responsibilities at Boulogne would be completed 
until the ship was ready to depart.49 The naval representative on the committee accepted the 
decision.50 With the SECR experienced in the operation of railway ports, their commercial 
connections to Boulogne, and the involvement of the company in the construction works 
being supervised by Tempest, the committee concluded that the SECR represented ‘the most 
suitable’ entity to take on the responsibilities of the ‘single authority’.51 
 
Despite consensus having been achieved in France, the change in procedure required 
ratification from the War Office, which was inexorably slow to arrive. Permission was first 
requested on 4 February; confirmation finally arrived on 17 March, effectively putting the 
scheme into stasis for six critical weeks.52 Further delays were necessary in order for Dent to 
‘collect his own staff’ for work in the port, for those men to observe the ‘routine working of a 
port’ prior to taking over, and for arrangements between the SECR and the French rail 
authorities to be finalised. Following discussions between Dent, the Director of Railway 
Transport and representatives of the Commissions Regulatrices, the SECR was finally 
authorised to take over ‘all the work of shunting, marshalling and the making up of trains in 
the Bassin Loubet at Boulogne’ from 25 April’.53 The working of the other ports at which the 
BEF received shipments would continue to operate under the existing system. 
                                                          
49 WO 95/3953 Clayton to Shortland, 16 February 1915. 
50  WO 95/3953 Proceedings of second meeting. The acquiescence of the naval authorities was deemed 
paramount to the continuation of negotiations. See WO 95/74 diary entry, 17 January 1915. 
51 WO 95/3953 Clayton to Maxwell, 16 February 1915; TNA: PRO WO 95/75 Director of Supplies, diary entries, 
24 and 26 February 1915. 
52 WO 95/3953 diary entries 5 and 27 February 1915; TNA: PRO WO 95/3954 Inspector General, diary entries, 8 
and 17 March 1915. 
53 WO 95/3954 Clayton to Maxwell, 21 March 1915; TNA: PRO WO 95/3955 Inspector General, diary entry 20 
April 1915; TNA: PRO WO 95/58 Director of Ordnance Services, diary entry, 19 April 1915. 
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The result of these delays was to increase congestion at Boulogne, as huge quantities of 
supplies were despatched to a port largely incapable of handling them.54 With demands from 
the front rising exponentially as the BEF went into battle at Neuve Chapelle, the War Office 
was attempting to despatch as many ships, as quickly as possible, to ensure supplies were 
made available to the troops. Unfortunately, this meant that ships were arriving in quick 
succession rather than leaving a sufficient interval to ensure each ship’s cargo could be 
discharged and, crucially, cleared from the quayside before the next ship was berthed. Further 
problems were experienced as a result of staff at Boulogne receiving incomplete or 
insufficient information regarding the contents of each arriving ship. As an example, the SS 
Juno set out for Boulogne on 13 March, with port staff informed only that she carried ‘general 
cargo’.55 With limited crane facilities available, it was imperative that the port authorities 
received prior notice of the stores arriving so that they could be directed to the most suitable 
berth and dealt with punctually. Without this information, Clayton warned, the supply 
services could not guarantee that urgent supplies would be processed in time.56 
 
To alleviate this issue,57 Dent suggested the installation of a bespoke telephone line between 
Boulogne and the SECR’s offices in London, Folkestone, Dover, Calais and Dunkirk. Such a 
system would allow for early information to be received as to the contents of each ship prior 
to their arrival, allowing those on the French side of the Channel to direct the incoming traffic 
to the most suitable berth and to arrange for the provision of any specific requirements, such 
as specialist unloading gear, to be made available.58 The War Office had no problem with the 
installation of the line; however, although the BEF had been granted ‘every latitude’ for the 
improvement of local transport facilities within the zone populated by the fighting troops, 
schemes for more permanent installations of this type had to be signed off by the French.59 
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The installation of telephone facilities for the use of the SECR was clearly not considered a 
priority at Grand Quartier Général, as by the end of October 1915 no decision had been 
obtained regarding the matter. Clayton had clearly felt all along that the French were 
‘unlikely’ to accede to Dent’s request,60 but following an appeal from Dent to ‘badger’ Joffre’s 
staff a further enquiry was made and a subsequent refusal from Joffre arrived in early 
November.61 The reason given was that the French were disinclined to grant such privileges 
as requested by Dent to a civilian firm. Not only would the proposed telephone lines be of use 
during the war, they would also potentially give the SECR a competitive advantage once 
peacetime returned, to the possible detriment of French firms operating in the same sphere. 
Furthermore, the French had perceived that a ‘custom’ of unauthorised use of the telephones 
in the SECR’s offices had ‘grown up’ during 1915, and argued that the existing facilities were 
sufficient for the SECR’s requirements.62 
 
Although the ‘telephones incident’ may appear superficial, the disagreement demonstrates 
the limits of the ‘business arrangement’ between France and Britain during the war. 63 
Throughout the conflict, French and British authorities were involved in a complex series of 
negotiations, within which the post-war economic and strategic considerations of each 
partner provided an underlying context which militated against complete cooperation. 
Despite ostensibly seeking the same goal (the defeat of Germany), the war aims of the two 
powers were in many respects profoundly different, requiring both to participate constantly 
in a process of discussion and compromise in order to preserve the delicate connection 
between the two countries.64 The absence of a formal ‘contract’ prior to the war,65 coupled 
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to the lack of any organ for collective decision-making,66 reinforced the primacy of national 
considerations to the potential detriment of coalition requirements. In 1915, the relative 
strength of the French in terms of ‘land power’, and the location of the expanding BEF on 
French soil – something that had not been anticipated on such a scale prior to 1914 – acted 
as a powerful bargaining tool in such discussions. The French retained the ‘upper hand’ and 
would do so until after the attrition of 1916 further ‘equalised’ the relative strengths of the 
allied forces on the Western Front.67 Consequently, the installation of a bespoke telephone 
system to assist British logistics was not deemed of sufficient importance to the war effort to 
overrule the national concerns of post-war industrial positioning. 
A failure of ‘civilianization’? 
Although the work of the SECR employees at Boulogne did not create problems related 
specifically to the integration of civil and military labour, the continued growth of the BEF and 
consequent increase in demand for stores to be processed through the Channel ports created 
immense strain in the system. Dent was also increasingly disengaged from the project. Such 
were the competing demands for men of recognised organisational ability, that Dent’s 
commitments were numerous by the summer of 1915. In addition to his responsibilities with 
the REC, Dent was personally involved in the interviewing of applicants for commissions in 
the Railway Operating Division, and in the identification and organisation of Belgian 
railwaymen from among the refugees in Britain. Consequently, the day-to-day operations at 
the Bassin Loubet were left to Francis Flood-Page, the company’s Northern District 
Superintendent. Although clearly a capable man (he would receive the Military Cross in 
1916),68 Flood-Page lacked both the experience and authority of the SECR’s General Manager. 
 
Despite encouraging early signs of ‘considerable progress’ being made in the arrangement of 
the storage accommodation, by mid-May – just weeks after the SECR had taken over – the 
                                                          
66 G.J. De Groot, Douglas Haig, 1861-1928 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 168. 
67 Even then, as Philpott has demonstrated, there was a ‘reticence’ among both British and French leaders 
(political and military) to accept the ‘give and take’ of alliance politics. See W. Philpott, ‘Managing the British 
Way in Warfare: France and Britain’s Continental Commitment, 1904-1918’, in The British Way in Warfare: 
Power and the International System, 1856-1956: Essays in honour of David French, ed. by K. Neilson and G. 
Kennedy (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 83–100 (p. 85). 
68 I am indebted to Jim Greaves of the South-Eastern and Chatham Railway Society for providing this information. 
 
 
16 
 
level of congestion at Boulogne reached a stage at which the Director of Supplies had to 
authorise the stacking of stores ‘in the open’.69 The following month, the sustained increase 
in demand for ammunition from the front led GHQ to request additional labour to be sent to 
Boulogne to ensure that the shells required at the front could be discharged and sent forward 
every day.70 For the specialist duty of handling potentially lethal explosives, the Army Service 
Corps [ASC] was required to transfer men from Calais on a temporary basis to alleviate the 
immediate problem.71 By late August, the Director of Supplies (Brigadier-General E.E. Carter) 
had clearly begun to lose patience with what he deemed ‘the so called Dent scheme’s’ 
inability to clear the ports as promised by the railway company the previous winter.72 
 
A report was commissioned by Carter following an inspection of the port and discussed at a 
conference held by the IGC on 1 September. The report focused upon the ‘difficulties which 
had been experienced since the introduction of the working under [the] SECR’, and concluded 
with a decision being made to revert back to the ‘old method’ of removing supplies for a 
fortnight’s trial.73 The ASC regained the responsibility for the removal of stores from the 
quayside, with the personnel of the SECR retained purely for the discharge of ships and as 
labour to be directed by the military. The trial was found to be ‘an unqualified success, as 
ships were offloaded and deal with more quickly’, with all the military departments concerned 
wishing for the scheme to continue.74 The naval departments were less satisfied, however, 
and a report proposing a reversion to the ‘old method’ of discharging ships was forwarded to 
the Principal Naval Transport Officer on 1 October.75 Despite the protestations of the IGC who 
was ill-disposed to ‘disturb the existing arrangement’,76 the War Office was forced to concede 
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that with the labour on shore now back in the hands of the army, it was illogical for the labour 
on board the ships to remain outside the control of the navy.77 The argument was particularly 
compelling when it is remembered that of all the supply ports under the control of the BEF 
during 1915 (Boulogne, Calais, Le Havre, Marseilles and Rouen), only Boulogne had been 
subject to the ‘single authority’ experiment involving the employment of civilian experts in 
coordinating roles. As a result, the SECR surrendered responsibility for the unloading of ships 
on 24 October; six months after the experiment had begun it had been terminated.78 
Conclusion 
In his pioneering study of British logistics, Ian M. Brown concludes that the decision to revert 
back to military control at the port was ‘apparently a case of anti-civilian phobia’, with critics 
fearing that the SECR personnel’s inexperience of warfare may have rendered them incapable 
of supplying the demands of military warfare.79 This conclusion overplays the dominance of 
‘ingrained distrust’ of civilians within the BEF.80 Throughout 1915, as the British Army began 
to grapple with the complexities and challenges of warfare on a scale previously unimagined, 
the BEF sought the advice of technical experts on everything from shipping to shoe repairs.81 
The ‘Dent scheme’ was not persevered with into 1916 and beyond because the nature of the 
British war effort to that point had not provided the required impetus for the military, and 
indeed political, authorities to re-evaluate the entire logistical bedrock underpinning the BEF’s 
existence.82 Although congestion remained a considerable issue on both sides of the Channel, 
it had not as yet become the compelling factor in operations that it would become during the 
following summer when the BEF engaged in offensive action on a hitherto unimagined scale.83 
Despite being largely ignored in subsequent works, the ‘Dent mission’ is worthy of study as it 
demonstrates how the evolving industrial character of the Western Front was fully developed 
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neither at the end of 1914 when Dent made his initial observations, nor in October 1915 when 
the experiment was drawn to a close. 
  
Although there was a clear realisation within the military of the potential benefits of utilising 
civilian expertise to increase labour productivity and improve fluidity on the transport 
network in northern France. However, there was neither the political will to expand this 
process to cover all ports, nor the urgent requirement for this expertise to be employed on 
anything other than an ‘ad hoc’, localised level until the demands of the Somme emphasized 
the inherent weaknesses in the extant structure. The ‘unmistakable proof of the value, 
indeed, the necessity of centralised control’ had yet to surface.84 As Geddes would later 
bemoan in his survey of British transportation on the Western Front, the emphasis placed 
upon decentralisation of command had led to the development of a transport system in which 
staff duties had become heavily ‘compartmentalised’ and in which no single authority – civil 
or military – controlled the entire logistics network from factory to front line.85 The single-
dock experiment at Boulogne was essentially little more than tinkering with one link in a long 
and complex chain; one with numerous weaknesses. 
 
As a result, the SECR’s failure to generate the projected levels of productivity – in part the 
result of French protectionism, as well as that of Dent’s overambitious estimates and the 
continuing increases in demands being made on the port – overshadowed the long-term 
improvements made by the SECR. The relatively small-scale of the experiment combined with 
the undesirable complications of operating different working practices at Boulogne to the 
other BEF ports to see the system ‘shelved’ before the end of 1915. 86  The SECR would, 
however, leave behind a port which was in a much better position than any other in use by 
the BEF to deal with the colossal demands of industrial war, as was proven by the results of 
Sir Eric Geddes’ investigations into the efficiency of the transport network in late 1916. 
Geddes found that Boulogne was the only port in use by the BEF during the Battle of the 
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Somme adhering to the principles of contingency (by ensuring that the port was not being 
asked to work at more than eighty per cent of its capacity) to allow time for dealing with 
inevitable fluctuations in the arrivals of ships and sufficient flexibility to cope with 
unforeseeable emergencies.87  
 
During a period in which the eventual scale of the war remained beyond the comprehension 
of the authorities, the experiments of 1915 involving the SECR at the port of Boulogne 
demonstrate both the types of skills required to sustain the Western Front, and the 
contribution that even those not trained, and in many cases too old to fight, could make to 
the successful prosecution of the war. Yet it would take the gargantuan struggles of 1916 at 
Verdun and the Somme, and the corresponding failure of the extant system of supply to 
sustain both conflagrations, to create the necessary conditions – political, military and inter-
allied – to demonstrate the need for a comprehensive reassessment of the logistics network 
on the Western Front. Unlike Geddes, freed from his responsibilities to the North-Eastern 
Railway to oversee the installation of an entirely new, all-encompassing transport directorate 
with the support of Lloyd George, Haig and the French; the Bassin Loubet in 1915 was, for 
Francis Dent, just one of numerous concerns for the General Manager of the SECR. At the end 
of 1915 the importance of the particular job being carried out by the SECR, and indeed of 
particular role played by ‘the science of transportation’ in the prosecution of industrialised 
warfare,88 was yet to be fully understood. In the developing historiography on the conduct of 
the First World War, this continues to be the case. 
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